Gary Sauer-Thompson discusses the complexity of issues to do with Afghanistan, Iraq and the Australian relationship with the United States. It is a curious nexus of politics, morality and foreign policy doctrines in navigating a path of least dissatisfaction through through the three areas.

Democratically and militarily Australia cannot completely rebuff the US in Afghanistan and Iraq. Australia is too reliant on America for the continuance of Australian military power. Democratically there is a strong conservative media that idealizes the Great and Powerful Friends doctrine who have to be placated, not to mention a significant enough constituency that concurs on the policy.

There is the politics as well. As Hugh White writes Rudd wants to disengage from Iraq while maintaining the relationship with the US. White writes:

Hence Rudd's dilemma. He wants to do the Bush administration some favours, but he is reluctant to send more troops to Iraq. The compromise seems to be that he and his colleagues will urge the Europeans to do more without promising that Australia will do more itself.

White argues that strategically Afghanistan is of no interest to Australia, and he is correct. As he noted extremists are operating in Pakistan now, and the likelihood of Afghanistan transitioning to a secular free-market democracy are slim.

The main difference is morality. Afghanistan is easier to swallow from a moral point of view than Iraq is. We went into Afghanistan to bring Osama Bin Laden to justice for his crimes against humanity. For that reason alone it is more morally palatable than Iraq is, the latter which was predicated on fraud, propaganda and incompetence. I think this is why the Rudd Government will choose to focus on Afghanistan in their policy. (reply)
Another data point for a state having no legitimacy unless it takes a social democratic approach. Nathanial Fink describes the counter-insurgency campaign in Afghanistan:

Consider, for example, the question of roads. When U.N. teams begin building new stretches of road in volatile Afghan provinces such as Zabul and Kandahar, insurgents inevitably attack the workers. But as the projects progress and villagers begin to see the benefits of having paved access to markets and health care, the Taliban attacks become less frequent.

Non-state actors gain their political legitimacy in the same way. Hezbollah and Hamas both have social democratic and judicial components which not only replaces a weak state but helps keep it out of those areas.

Hezbollah is the second largest employer in Lebanon. It runs hospitals, orphanages, discount pharmacies and garbage collection. All of those are services which governments in Australia provide. (more)

Australia deployed light infantry as part of a United Nations force to East Timor which it led. Indonesia lost its political fight in East Timor and withdrew KOPASSUS and TNI support for the pro-Indonesian militia. Australia's force structure was unobtrusive and non-abrasive. Tellingly though, Australia secured the political environment before the military deployment. This can inform Australian policy on Iraq and Afghanistan. (more)
Well not exactly. Beazley got a run in an E.J. Dionne WaPo op-ed article titled, "First Step? Admit There's a Problem" [reg req]. Neither American Republicans or Democrats have any plan for what to do in Iraq. Clarkes op-ed on the same page, on the same subject, basically says Bush has no plan . Clark then manages to not offer one in return. (more)

The recent announcement of Australia sending the SASR to Afghanistan along with a Provincial Reconstruction Team points to the unfocused nature of Australia's involvement in the American led "War on Terror". The Howard government chose to join the United States pursuit of terrorism as a military issue. This is in part due to the "Great and Powerful Friends" (GAPF) doctrine of foreign policy that the Liberal Party adheres to. But equally influential on our policy toward Afghanistan has been the weak manner in which Australia has contributed. We are not in control of the outcome, and consequentially the Howard government is just floating along with no focus, and no possible means to take the expeditions in Afghanistan and Iraq to any conclusion. Australia needs to return to the policy of December 2001, pull out of Iraq, and focus its full energies on defeating Al Queda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. (more)

In 2001 Australian policy was that Australian forces were in Afghanistan for the "War on Terror", not for "Afghanistan", meaning Australia was not there for nation building. As a consequence Australia sent the very tip of its land based spear. The very effective Special Air Services Regiment (SASR). The SASR is trained to be highly independent and conduct extended operations, behind enemy lines, and without resupply for a week or longer.

John Howard recently announced that the SASR will be heading back to Afghanistan for a twelve month tour. This was met by many in Australia with a sigh of relief that we would be sending "more troops" to help out. But the SASR isn't for civil order, or police work. They are not infantry, they are for discovering and destruction of enemy forces. From what I can glean from different news reports, it seems the US may be winding down its special forces operations in Afghanistan. The British are also preparing to send five thousand of their infantry to Afghanistan, with the British SAS and Australian SAS preparing the way for them. The final reason is that there has been a resurgence of Al Queda and Taliban fighters, especially in, near, or on the Pakistan border. (more)
Cam Riley: South Sea Republic. Freedom, liberty, equity and an Australian Republic.