Former diplomat Gregory Djerejian argues that Georgia would be wiser to adopt realpolitick foreign policy, "Saakashvili, an apparently quite idealistic 40 year-old former NY lawyer, seems to have erred too much in thinking that giddy summitry with Western big-wigs might pay dividends but unfortunately, insufficiently appreciated the disastrous waning in U.S. power these past years, despite his constant hankering for NATO membership, and thus has fallen short with regard to better appreciating a variable which would have been more apropos, namely, a harsh dose of realpolitik." This means recognizing Russian power on Georgia's northern border and conducting policy within that limitation. (more)
With the Bush Administration coming to a close what are we to make of foreign policy during that period? It is commonly supposed that a cabal of neo-conservatives hijacked the normal state policy apparatus and enforced radical policies on America. Certainly PNAC and neo-conservatism were discovered after the rush to invade Iraq was pushed through the mass media. But both those groups based their policy around American global hegemony and the maintenance of the hegemon. That is not really that radical, it is how super-powers have acted since the beginning of time.

White House from photogeneric's photostream.

Probably the best idea we have of neo-conservative foreign policy is from an article by Irving Kristol. Where he almost bmusedly discusses the neo-conservative approach to foreign policy. Again, it is not really that radical. It is based upon national patriotism, distaste for world government (UN etc), the friend-enemy distinction in international relations and finally that American interests are global, not national;

Finally, for a great power, the "national interest" is not a geographical term, except for fairly prosaic matters like trade and environmental regulation. A smaller nation might appropriately feel that its national interest begins and ends at its borders, so that its foreign policy is almost always in a defensive mode.

A larger nation has more extensive interests. And large nations, whose identity is ideological, like the Soviet Union of yesteryear and the United States of today, inevitably have ideological interests in addition to more material concerns.

This can be construed as an idealogical justification for the defence of democratic Israel from the monarchies, oligarchies and dictatorships of the Middle East. In conjunction with the friend-enemy distinction it can possibly be seen to aim at Saddam Hussein as well.

But what of American interests being global? Neo-conservatism, like conservatives from the 19thC see the collapse of the nation that ensures the freedom of the seas - formerly Britain, now America - as an essential role in the global order .

Consequently the maintenance of American hegemony becomes an altruistic and necessary policy. Currently the US maintains it position at the top of the international pile through its industry and culture which are massive consumers of finite energy resources. In addition, a one party state in China is now challenging the US for these resources.

The Carter Doctrine has been around since the 1970s and states that the US will go to war to ensure the security of its energy supplies. This is not a new thing and it is possible many decades of US policy makers have become used to the idea of some kind of US military intervention in the Middle East would happen.

After the attacks on New York on September 11th a US national security document included the doctrine of pre-emption, which can be called the Bush Doctrine. This enabled the US to strike another country based on the assumption of terror threats:

We will disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by: ... defending the United States, the American people, and our interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders.While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country;

By 2002 there were the doctrines in place to strike into the heart of the Middle East with US military power. The political sell of it was a different matter. The Bush Administration went quickly from freedom and democracy, to nuclear weapons, to mushroom clouds, and so forth. In the end they settled on the Schmittian policy of vilifying their political opponents.

So how radical was the Bush foreign policy? The main incident the Bush Administration will be remembered for will be the invasion of Iraq. Here the cassus belli was tenuous at best and an outright fabrication at worst. The complete schmozzle of policies after the invasion immediately discredited what good will remained for America.

Where did the policy for the invasion of Iraq come from? The Bush Doctrine allows for the pre-emptive strike against nations based on terror threats, but Iraq did not satisfy this. Neo-conservative foriegn policy allows for the friend-enemy distinction which Hussein obviously fell on the wrong side of. But not enough to invade a country and place American military power at risk.

Bush often talks in speeches of freedom and democracy and how America is bringing it to Iraq. There was also the hope that it could shake up the region and democracy could flower across the Middle East. The opposite has happened with Iran becoming more powerful for having an American neighbour in Iraq. The freedom and democracy reason is weak as it was one of the constantly shifting political sells during the run up to the war. I don't doubt Bush and others hope for it, but it is not enough to justify an invasion policy and its consequent cost.

The only other alternative was that it was strategic in an attempt to secure American energy supply with the establishment of a geographical stake in the Middle East along with a political, economic and militaristic one. In this area the Bush Administration was not radical as it followed on from a doctrine that dated back to the 1970s. It can also be construed that this process was to ensure American pre-eminence economically and in global affairs.
Mead argues that the democratic nature of American foreign policy has been superior to the isolated genius' behind continentalist policy (ie Bismarck or Kissinger). Mead writes:

The [democratic policy making] system is stable because it is homeostatic; although interest groups perceive themselves in a constant struggle, the net effect of all those struggles is to keep society constantly seeking the point at which dissatisfaction is minimised.

A very succinct description of the liberal republican process.
I sometimes wonder if authors write books specifically for me. Walter Mead's Special Providence is one such book. It discusses American foreign policy under the broad washes of Hamiltonian, Jeffersonian, Wilsonian and Jacksonian doctrines. It also asks why is American foreign policy blind to its own history, presuming it all started with WWII, when American politics and even the American nation was so reliant on American politicians getting the foreign policy right. (more)
Another data point for the definition of Empire being control of foreign policy. H.H. Scullard writes on Rome's run-in with Sparta:

But Flaminius would not go as far as his [Greek] allies desired; as with Phillip [of Macedon], he wished to cripple, but not destroy. Once again it was the Romans and not the allies who dictated terms, which included the surrender by Nabis of Argos and other towns and of his fleet, an indemnity, and the renouncing of the right to make war or alliances.

When Germany established a colony in New Guinea in the 1880s Queensland raised up militia and prepared to go and kick the Germans out. The Colonial Office was not happy, and told the Colony of Queensland to drop any thoughts of military action against the German outpost. Britain was concerned it would precipitate war in Europe.

It is interesting to note that Australia didn't bother ratifying the Statute of Westminster until 1942 after the GAPF had been switched from the UK to the US.

The Department of External Affairs was established in 1935 when it was split out of the Prime Minister's department. Prior to that the Prime Minister had usually dealt directly with the Dominions Office and it was not until 1974 that the Australian High Commissioner in London reported to the foreign affairs department rather than directly to the Prime Minister.

Joan Beaumont writes:

The department's role in these pre-1939 years was so limited that it was scarcely recognisable as a modern foreign office.

Quite late in Australian history.
Is Australia in Iraq for oil or is it because of the Great and Powerful Friends doctrine [GAPF] of foreign policy? In my opinion, while energy security plays a minor role, it is predominantly because of the latter. (more)
What is a superpower and holder of the moral high ground to do when no matter what they do, they are criticised? (more)
cam : It is the same problem Australia has with Thailand and Fiji, we man the trumpets to invade Iraq and back military imposition of democracy with force, yet regionally it is obvious we cannot do anything even to make little, weak and tiny Fiji change its ways. We are armed with rhetoric and nothing more. Best if we don't make moral gaps like we did with Iraq, when we have no stick for even our local annoyances.

Like you said, internal consistency is the best policy.

And now a jot, following on from one and two : so assuming Pax Unus [unitary peace] and the patterns of how an empire behaves are consistent over time; this suggests that the greatest perceived threat to an empire is not nation-states, rogue-states, terrorism or non-state actors - it is an independent foreign policy.

(more)
Continuing on from the previous article, part of the Roman move against rivals in the East was the war with Antiochus. The Senate's policy followed Scipio's such that Antiochus had to not only be driven out of Greece, but his power in Asia Minor reduced such that he could have no independent foreign policy. Scipio believed that this was the only way peace could be achieved. (more)

The 1990s has seen an acceleration of globalisation as the prior Cold War nations opened their economies and the democratic dividend started to be felt in Europe and parts of Asia. The increasing capital, labor and communication flows of globalisation make many aspects of the old industrial order uncertain - one of these being the authority of the nation-state. (more)
Cam Riley: South Sea Republic. Freedom, liberty, equity and an Australian Republic.