Henry Rau argues that the use of force to spread democracy and freedom is a new strand of foreign policy known as conservative internationalism. He argues that the previous two schools, realism and liberal internationalism now have a third school to contend with.
The main data point is Ronald Reagan and his threat of force which brought the authoritarian USSR down to smaller democratic republics and/or authoritarian regimes. Russia has after all returned to authoritarianism under Putin.
It is a bit overly mythically to Reagan, the USSR had been deconstructing itself anyway and the Brezhnev Doctrine was no longer in force; which is the use of force to protect communism from the spread of capitalism and democracy.
The thesis is tenuous, such as claiming Jefferson and Polk expanded freedom by expanding US territory, in Jefferson's case with the Louisiana Purchase. Rau also argues that Jefferson and Polk saw increasing liberty as bringing equality and somehow the Louisiana Purchase fits this. Which is pretty weak.
Rau also argues that war against the Barbary Pirates shows the willingness of force. But Walter Russell Mead argues that this is Hamiltonian foreign policy and related to the doctrine of freedom of the seas (for American shipping) rather than free trade.
The argument is better when it is open about imperialism and force; which will be used to establish democracies which brings us back to neo-conservatism. It is hard not to view this as an exercise to give the invasion of Iraq and neo-conservative thinking a historical basis so it does not seem so radical and thoughtless.
It appears that conservative internationalism is neo-conservatism in the wrappings of power politics and imperialism with the attempted legitimisation via the ghosts of Reagan and Jefferson.
William Kristol writes that the United States cannot turn away from a pro-Democratic government and nation. This is consistent with Irving Kristol's description of neo-conservative foreign policy:
Barring extraordinary events, the United States will always feel obliged to defend, if possible, a democratic nation under attack from nondemocratic forces, external or internal.It appears that John McCain has adopted the same policy, with the twist that Christian nations must be defended - supposedly from authoritarian atheist hordes? - in order to save 'the friend' from 'the enemy'. In this manner McCain's foreign policy is neo-conservative and a continuation of Bush's foreign policy. However as Gregory Djerejain writes:
Look, all of this would have been stupid and deeply flawed policy, but at least morally defensible, if we meant to actually defend the Georgians. But we don't, and never will, as this would mean a war with Russia.Consequently any solution to this war will be diplomatic and not involve military force. Currently this conflict will continue for as long as the Russians say it will. The United States is in a politically weak position and Putin knows it.
With the Bush Administration coming to a close what are we to make of foreign policy during that period? It is commonly supposed that a cabal of neo-conservatives hijacked the normal state policy apparatus and enforced radical policies on America. Certainly PNAC and neo-conservatism were discovered after the rush to invade Iraq was pushed through the mass media. But both those groups based their policy around American global hegemony and the maintenance of the hegemon. That is not really that radical, it is how super-powers have acted since the beginning of time.
White House from photogeneric's photostream.
White House from photogeneric's photostream.Finally, for a great power, the "national interest" is not a geographical term, except for fairly prosaic matters like trade and environmental regulation. A smaller nation might appropriately feel that its national interest begins and ends at its borders, so that its foreign policy is almost always in a defensive mode. A larger nation has more extensive interests. And large nations, whose identity is ideological, like the Soviet Union of yesteryear and the United States of today, inevitably have ideological interests in addition to more material concerns.This can be construed as an idealogical justification for the defence of democratic Israel from the monarchies, oligarchies and dictatorships of the Middle East. In conjunction with the friend-enemy distinction it can possibly be seen to aim at Saddam Hussein as well. But what of American interests being global? Neo-conservatism, like conservatives from the 19thC see the collapse of the nation that ensures the freedom of the seas - formerly Britain, now America - as an essential role in the global order . Consequently the maintenance of American hegemony becomes an altruistic and necessary policy. Currently the US maintains it position at the top of the international pile through its industry and culture which are massive consumers of finite energy resources. In addition, a one party state in China is now challenging the US for these resources. The Carter Doctrine has been around since the 1970s and states that the US will go to war to ensure the security of its energy supplies. This is not a new thing and it is possible many decades of US policy makers have become used to the idea of some kind of US military intervention in the Middle East would happen. After the attacks on New York on September 11th a US national security document included the doctrine of pre-emption, which can be called the Bush Doctrine. This enabled the US to strike another country based on the assumption of terror threats:
We will disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by: ... defending the United States, the American people, and our interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders.While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country;By 2002 there were the doctrines in place to strike into the heart of the Middle East with US military power. The political sell of it was a different matter. The Bush Administration went quickly from freedom and democracy, to nuclear weapons, to mushroom clouds, and so forth. In the end they settled on the Schmittian policy of vilifying their political opponents. So how radical was the Bush foreign policy? The main incident the Bush Administration will be remembered for will be the invasion of Iraq. Here the cassus belli was tenuous at best and an outright fabrication at worst. The complete schmozzle of policies after the invasion immediately discredited what good will remained for America. Where did the policy for the invasion of Iraq come from? The Bush Doctrine allows for the pre-emptive strike against nations based on terror threats, but Iraq did not satisfy this. Neo-conservative foriegn policy allows for the friend-enemy distinction which Hussein obviously fell on the wrong side of. But not enough to invade a country and place American military power at risk. Bush often talks in speeches of freedom and democracy and how America is bringing it to Iraq. There was also the hope that it could shake up the region and democracy could flower across the Middle East. The opposite has happened with Iran becoming more powerful for having an American neighbour in Iraq. The freedom and democracy reason is weak as it was one of the constantly shifting political sells during the run up to the war. I don't doubt Bush and others hope for it, but it is not enough to justify an invasion policy and its consequent cost. The only other alternative was that it was strategic in an attempt to secure American energy supply with the establishment of a geographical stake in the Middle East along with a political, economic and militaristic one. In this area the Bush Administration was not radical as it followed on from a doctrine that dated back to the 1970s. It can also be construed that this process was to ensure American pre-eminence economically and in global affairs.
Australia deployed light infantry as part of a United Nations force to East Timor which it led. Indonesia lost its political fight in East Timor and withdrew KOPASSUS and TNI support for the pro-Indonesian militia. Australia's force structure was unobtrusive and non-abrasive. Tellingly though, Australia secured the political environment before the military deployment. This can inform Australian policy on Iraq and Afghanistan.
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I normally only read The Economist when I am waiting at the airport. I got to read it front-to-back tonight; United Airlines lost my wife's luggage. There were two articles [behind paywall] on the laziness of trade talks in Doha. I think both articles misjudged neo-conservatism and the national conservatism that is being practiced in world trade now.
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Gary Rosen
is the editor of
Commentary
and a self-confessed neo-conservative. He has a book-review of Francis Fukuyama's new book. The article is titled;
The War Among the Conservatives. A leading neocon thinker breaks ranks with his former allies over Iraq.
The review itself is boring and doesn't help me decide to read the book or not, but the second half of the article is all refutation. That is where it gets interesting.
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The "Neo-conservatism" movement rose to prominence soon after the United States led an invasion on Iraq in the name of pre-emptive force. While the Neo-conservative movement had left clues to their ideology previous to the Bush Administration, their political philosophy had escaped the notice of the mass media and American population. Since 2001, the Neo-conservative policies have exhausted themselves against the Sunni-triangle and in the rugged terrain of Afghanistan. The events of the last three years have discredited Neo-conservative ideology.
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